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ABSTRACT
Capital investment has been the traditional means of expanding airport
capacity. However, as the cost of capital expansion increases, non-capital-
intensive techniques such as operational quota systems or peak-hour surcharges
have been proposed as alternatives. Although these measures do not physically
expand capacity, they postpone the need for expansion by promoting more in-
tensive and more economically efficient use of existing capacity.
This report examines the leading theoretical studies not only of airport
peak-hour pricing but also of the congestion costs associated with airport
delays and presents a consistent formulation of both. The report also con-
siders purely administrative measures, such as quotas, and hybrid systems which
combine administrative and economic control techniques. These are all com-
pared to the real-world situation and problems of implementation discussed.
The actual experiences of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
at the three major New York area airports and the British Airports Authority
at Heathrow are then presented. Both organizations administer hybrid quota/
peak-hour pricing systems in conjunction with their respective air traffic
control authorities. Their experience is compared with the theoretical
analyses.
The conclusions are that non-capital-intensive techniques are effective
in shifting the demand for airport services and, as a result, in increasing
utilization and in decreasing delays. The potential savings from postponing
or eliminating capital investment and from increasing the efficiency of the
air transportation system are enormous. However, the wide-spread adoption
of such techniques throughout the United States would be such a radical depar-
ture from existing policies that resistance from several sectors of the avia-
tion community could be expected. These institutional issues facing the United
States before a peak-hour surcharge system could be widely imposed must be
explored and in the long run may be more important than the economic issues
involved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Capital investment has been the traditional means of expanding airport
capacity to meet the needs of the aviation community. However, as the costs
of capital expansion have become increasingly prohibitive, more attention
has been paid to alternate, non-capital-intensive techniques for accomo-
dating increased demand. These alternatives range from those that are purely
economic (e.g. charging appropriate runway usage fees, differentiated by time
of day and by location) to those that are purely administrative (e.g. imposing
maximumlimits on the number of aircraft which may use specific airports or
runways during a given time interval). These measures do not physically expand
airport capacity, but they can postpone the need for physical expansion by
promoting more intensive and more economically efficient use of existing
capacity. To this extent, they are alternatives to capital investment.
These non-capital alternatives can be effective because of the charac-
teristics of airport demand. First, hourly demand varies widely over the course
of a typical day. This is true for virtually every airport in the world, large
or small. Second, different users derive different values from operations at
a particular airport based on their type of aircraft, the time of the day,
the locality, etc. Third, operators of large conercial aircraft are severly
constrained by runway length, strength of pavement, electronic instrumentation
for airport approach and the like, while other users can operate, undermost
weather conditions, from unsophisticated and relatively inexpensive facilities.
These characteristics of demand (with the possiIle exception of the third)
are not unique to airports but are common to other modes of transportation
and certain public utilities. Thus, the basic economic concepts of peak-load
and efficient pricing, particularly marginal cost pricing, can be borrowed
from Steiner's, Hirshleifer's, [2 and Vickrey's[3] studies of public
utilities and toll highways. -However, the airport problem does have several
peculiar aspects not covered in these early studies. As a result, efficient
allocation of airport capacity has rapidly developed as a separate field of
study since the late 1960s when the congestion problem first attracted
sizable attention.
This report reviews the theoretical literature addressing the airport
situation but does not discuss the sizable body of related materials dealing
with problems of a similar nature for other modes of transportation. In
addition to the theoretical analysis, the report reviews actual attempts to
modify airport demand through economic charges and administrative quotas by
the British Airports Authority, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
and the Federal Aviation Administration. Finally, the theory and the case
studies are analyzed together and conclusions are drawn.
3References for Section I
1. Steiner, Peter. "Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol.71 (1957), p. 585.
2. Hirshleifer, Jack. "Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comnent",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72 (1958), p. 451.
3. Vickrey, William. "Optimization of Traffic and Facilities", Journal
of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 1 (1967), pp. 123-136.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The alternatives to capital investment can be grouped into three
categories: El
Administrative Measures: Access to congested airports is restricted
through administrative fiat. The restrictions may be selectively applied
to specific categories of aviation, to certain periods of the day and to
some but not all runways of an airport. The establishment of a "quota"
system that limits the number of operations per hour is another form of
administrative control. Airport curfews (usually imposed to deal with the
night-time noise problem) are an extreme form of quota.
Economic Measures: Airport congestion is controlled through a pricing
system which imposes higher charges during periods of high demand than at
other times. This category can be further subdivided into measures that
place a peak-hour surcharge on aircraft movements and measures that levy
the surcharge directly on air passengers.
Hybrid Measures: Access is limited by a combination of administrative and
pricing alternatives. A quota system limiting hourly operations could be com-
bined with a peak-hour surcharge to assure that the available time slots are al-
located efficiently.
Aaministrative Measures
The first-order and short-term effects of administrative alternatives
are straightforward and predictable. As the number of flights at an airport
is reduced by imposing a quota on the number of flights scheduled or by banning
specific types of operations, congestion at that airport decreases. Because
$he relationship between airport demand and airport delay is very non-linear, a
carefully chosen limit on operations at a severely congested airport may
drastically reduce delays without a significant reduction in the number of
flights.* -Therefore, quotas and other administrative measures have
been (and continue to be) particularly attractive as a means of dealing
swiftly and effectively with airside congestion.**
In the long term, however, the impact and benefits of purely administra-
tive measures are less clear because they offer no assurance that economic
considerations will play a role in determining who will use a demonstrably
(by virtue of it being congested) valuable facility or how this facility will
be developed in the future.***
Once a user, for one reason or another, has been denied access to the air-
port, he has no way to prove that any given time slot is more valuable to him than
to its present occupant. As long as the present occupant is willing to pay the
fixed landing fee that the airport charges for the slot in question, everyone
else is excluded. There is no opportunity to "bid up" the price of the time
slot to reflect its value. Even where the time slots are periodically renego-
tiated there is no way, in the absence of a pricing mechanism, of ascertaining
that the right to land at any specific time will go to those who most covet
that right. In fact, it is not clear that reassignment contributes anything
Delay is generally proportional to (1-p)~ , where p is the "utilization ratio"
at the airport,i.e. the ratio between the number of operations at the airport
(demand) and the capacity of the airport.
** In 1969, the FAA in the United States imposed hourly quotason the scheduling
of operations at the three New York City airports, O'Hare International in
Chicago and Washington National. Thequotas have been generally credited for
strongly ameliorating the traffic congestion situation at these airports. Devel-
opments since 1969 have made it possible to eliminate the quotas-at the J.F.
Kennedy and Newark Airports in New York. However, the system continues to be
in effect at the other three airports. See Section VI.
* The purely administrative case is one in which rights for the use of
the runways are offered and time slots are allocated either by executive fiat
or through negotiations among users. In either situation, it is assumed that
no explicit or implicit economic bidding for landing rights and time slots
takes place.
to increasing the economic efficiency of the time slot allocations.
Administrative limitations on airport use, by keeping demand within
acceptable bounds, may assure the relatively smooth operation of the facility and
the lack of severe congestion into the foreseeable future. But with access to
the airport restricted and with potential users unable to indicate the true
value to them of future airport expansion, a false signal is conveyed to the
government and the public alike. In effect, by arbitrarily constraining
demand, artificial equilibrium conditions are created which, in the long run,
are likely to distort the nature, quality and cost of the transportation service
provided.
In sumnary, purely administrative measures, while effective and probably
desirable in dealing with short-term congestion problems, tend to be strongly
biased toward maintenance of the status quo when used over a protracted period
of time. Because economic value is not fully considered in allocating time slots,
current users cannot be displaced by others who may derive a higher economic
value from the same time slots and the airport cannot obtain through economic
mechanisms the information required to determine the need (or lack thereof) for
capacity expansion or for an improved (or, for that matter, a reduced) quality
of service.[293]
Economic Measures
The use of economic incentives rather than administrative controls could
alleviate the long-term allocation and development problems if those incentives
could be tied to the true costs and benefits of access to the airport. However,
this is not a simple task because there are both private and social costs in-
[4]
volved.
Once-the level of operations reaches the capacity of the airport, the
addition of one more operation slows the flow of all operations, generating
a delay for every aircraft attempting to use the facility. This additional
marginal operator considers only his own delay in deciding whether or not to
use the facility and fails to consider the impact on all other users. Thus
the true social marginal cost deviates from and is higher than the private
marginal cost. This can seen in Figure 1.
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. The basic cost of an operation without delays is C0. This cost remains
approximatejy constart for each operation until the number of operations reaches
perhaps 75 or 80 percent of the maximum capacity of the airport (say at no
operations per hour). Above that level of operations, significant delay costs
are incurred with the marginal cost to society (MC s) rising faster than the
private marginal cost to the individual operator (MC ). If only private costs
(C p) are assessed, operators will demand np operations per hour. If, however,
the social costs (C s) can be assessed, demand will fall to ns. At this point,
social costs are covered and congestion is decreased. The difficulty lies in
determining the social costs and adjusting operating fees to reflect them.
Hybrid Measures
Hybrid measures use a combination of administrative and economic tech-
niques to control demand. For example, the operational surcharge on general
aviation movements during peak periods which was imposed by the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey in 1968 coupled with the "quota system" that the
FAA imposed in 1969 created such a hybrid environment in the New York area. A
similar example is the combination of economic charges imposed by the British
Airports Authority and the quotas imposed by the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation
**
Authority at Heathrow Airport.
*The fact that appreciable delays begin to occur at that level of operations is
due to the non-uniformity in the schedule of airport movements and to the
numerous random deviations from that schedule.
**See Section VI for details.
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III. QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF THE RUNWAY PRICING PROBLEM
Several transportation economists have already constructed preliminary
mathematical models for the analysis of the runway pricing problem. Those
[1] [2]
of Park (1971), of Fitzgerald and Aneuryn-Evans (1973) and of de Neuf-
[3]
ville and Mira (1974) have attracted most attention. All three are some-
what similar in structure and assumptions and examine variations or extensions
of the same basic case. Consequently, only Park's model will be discussed in
detail.
Mathematical modeling makes an important contribution to our understanding
of the airport congestion and pricing problem by quantitatively formulating ideas
that are drawn out and somewhat ambiguous when presented verbally. Mathe-
matical manipulation also leads to new insights on the relationships among the
variables of the problem which in turn may lead to significant policy improve-
ments, especially in the heavily regulated environment of air transportation.
However, current models are based on a limited version of the "real world."
Most of the complexities present in practice have been suppressed at this
early stage for mathematical tractability. This limits the applicability of
the model's conclusions and is probably the main reason why policy-makers and
administrators concerned with congestion problems have proceeded in a pragmatic
rather than analytic fashion to date.
The Park model for determining congestion tolls at commercial airports
explicitly or implicitly makes the following simplifying assumptions:
Uniform Demand: Time variations in the demand rate are disregarded.
Single Market: There is only a single destination (and a single origin)
for all outgoing (and incoming) flights at the airport of interest.
Homogeneous Traffic: Only airlines use the airpot and all aircraft
are of the same size and have identical operating costs per unit of time.
Competitive Market Structure: No airline or airliees monopolize or oli-
gopolize the market. This does not preclude the case of regulated (fixed)
ticket prices.
In addition, all variables in the problem are assumed continuous.
The Basic Model
The objective of the Park Model is to identify policies which maximize
the net social benefits of the transportation service provided at the airport
for society as a whole. Stated mathematically, the model maximizes*
S =V-C (1)
where
S = the net benefits to society
V = the total value of the transportation service, and
C = the total cost of providing the service.**
The total value, V, of the transportation provided is a function of the
* The optimization problem is subject to a number of constraints imposed by
physical considerations (e.g. the finite capacity of the aircraft) and by
economic or regulatory factors. Different regulatoty environments impose
different constraints.
**This presentation of the basic economic model varies to some extent from
that of Park to make the notation consistent with that used later in this
review.
number of passengers, N, and of the number of flights, n.* Although the
exact form of the function is not really known, some of its properties are
(or can berationally inferred). Thus, V can de defined as
V 9 V(Nn) (2)
with the properties
V A aV > 0 (3)N - if
2
v A < 0 (4)NN= 2aN
(The value of an additional passenger trip, while holding the number of
flights constant, is positive - VN > 0 - but the increment of additional
value becomes smaller the more trips that are taken - VNN < 0.)
Likewise
V av < 0  (5)
n an
2
V 9- > 0 (6)
nn an
(If the number of passengers is held constant, .value decreases as the number
of flights increases - Vn < 0 - because delays increase. The more the
flights increase, the faster delays increase and the faster value decreases -
Vnn > 0.)
* It is convenient to think of S, V, C, N, and n as net benefits, value,
total costs, number of passengers and number of flights per unit of time(although the above quantities remain invariant in time because of the
demand uniformity assumption).
Finally -
2
VaV < 0 (7)Nn = N 9n
(The more passenger trips are affected by delay, the more value decreases -
VNn < 0.)
The total cost, C, of providing transportation service can be written
as
C = n - c = n - c(n) (8)
where c(n) is the cost per flight when there are n flights. Because cost
increases with delay, and delay increases with more flights,
c= dc > 0 (9)dn
and
c" d - > 0 (10)
dn
Although no specific functional forms for V and C have been postulated,
the analytical approach and the use of the mathematical model can still produce
useful results derived from the basic properties of the value and cost functions.
Before going further, it is necessary to consider a specific regulatory
environment with its applicable constraints. Park has examined two possible
situations. In the first, ticket prices are not regulated but determined by
c'ompetition. In this case, a congestion toll can be assessed against the air-
PPM
lines or the passengers creating the congestion with the same final result
because the passenger is the one who ultimately pays. If the fee is assessed
against the airlines, they will pass it on to the passengers traveling during
the congestion toll period through a fare increase. Passengers traveling at
off-peak periods or using uncongested airports will not pay congestion costs
because competitive pressures in these markets will prevent the airline from
spreading the congestion costs throughout the system.
In the second case, ticket prices are fixed by the government or other
authority at somewhat above the competitive level. Competition among airlines
is then based on schedules (i.e. frequency of flights) and not on price. 4]
This has two effects. To the extent that the increased frequencies exceed
airport capacity, congestion costs are increased. Also, how the congestion
toll is assessed now makes a difference. As in the unregulated environment,
it could be assessed against the passengers causing the congestion. But,
unlike the unregulated situation, a toll assessed against the airlines could
not be passed directly to the passengers causing the congestion without a change
in regulatory policy.
Traditionally in the regulated airline environment, costs are averaged
over the entire system and fares based on these average costs. As a result,
a toll assessed against an airline for congestion at a particular airport
would be spread among all the passengers using the system. Passengers traveling
during a peak period at a congested airport would pay only a small fraction.
of the congestion toll assessed against the airline and have little incentive
to change their travel patterns.
Although the domestic and international air transportation systems as they
exist today are based on fixed ticket prices, only the flexible ticket
case will be developed in detail to illustrate the general approach fol-
lowed. Because the analysis of the fixed ticket case is considerably more
complicated mathematically and would call for a much lengthier discussion,
its description is limited to the conclusions drawn.
Flexible Ticket Price Model
If a congestion toll of F dollars is imposed on each flight contributing
to the congestion, the fixed cost per flight is equal to c + F. If the tic-
ket price is denoted by p, then
n(c + F) = pN (11)
*
(Total costs equal total revenues. )
With the price of the ticket set atp, the level of passenger demand
can be determined from the equation
VN = p (12)
(Equilibrium is reached when the value of the trip to the marginal passenger,
VN( = ), is exactly equal to p.)
9N
Finally, if A is the number of seats in the standard aircraft, the
physical capacity constraint can be expressed as
- A 0 (13)
n
*As in all such economic analyses, it is assumed that the cost c per flight
also includes the normal - "reasonable"- return on investment required
by the airlines.
(The number of passengers per flight cannot exceed the seating capacity of
the aircraft.)
The optimization problem can now be stated as
Maximize S = V - C = V(N,n) - nc(n) (From Equation 1)
subject to the constraints
n(c + F) = pN (From Equation 11)
VN = (From Equation 12)
A < 0 (From Equation 13)
n -
Solving this problem in functional form,* at optimality the condition
must hold that
F = ncl - V = n - DV (14)
n dn an
(The congestion toll imposed on each flight must be equal to the increased
operating costs imposed on all other flights due to the increased delay caused
by the flight minus the value of the additional flight. But in the congested
case Vn is negative from Equation 5.)
Optimality cannot be achieved unless each additional (marginal) flight
at the airport pays for all the additional costs it imposes on passengers
and airlines. Thus, a congestion toll not only contributes to a socially
desirable result but is necessary to reach such a result.
A second condition for optimality is
A = (15n~ )
* Both Park and de Neufville and Mira use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to solve
this problem. However, it can also be solved by traditional calculus tech-
niques.
(At optimality, airplanes must fly full.)
This condition is hardly surprising in view of the simplifying assump-
tions made in the model-- perfect competition, no time variation in demand,
one origin and one destination. This demonstrates the limitations of exist-
ing analytical methods which implicitly assume that passenger demand from
destination to origin is identical in every respect to demand in the opposite
direction and that airplanes never have to return with partial loads to pick
up full loads at the origin.
Fixed Ticket Price Model
In this analysis ticket prices are fixed by regulatory agencies at
something above the competitive level (as seems indeed to be the case in
practice). However, airlines are still competing in quality of service:
larger and faster aircraft, better food service, more comfortable seats and
the like. The main aspect of service competition is flight frequency.
"That is, they [the airlines] add flights until load factors are forced
down to break-even levels." [5) Thus, low load factors are the rule, pas-
sengers are flown inefficiently, more flights are operated than necessary
and the excessive number of flights generates excessive congestion at airports.
Both Park and de Neufville and Mira show that this situation can be
ameliorated through the imposition of a congestion toll. However, it makes
a difference whether the toll is imposed directly on each flight (i.e. on
the airlines) or is collected in the form of surcharge from passengers.
With the fares fixed, airlines cannot pass on the cost of the toll to the
passengers (in contrast to the flexible ticket price case).
The mathematical analysis of congestion tolls on the airlines as
compared to surcharges on the passengers is quite complicated.* However,
the basic outline of the arguments for the two alternatives is straight-
forward.
Airline Tolls - If a congestion toll is assessed on the flight rather than
on the passengers, the cost of operating a flight increases. Because costs
and revenues must be in equilibrium (Equation 11), the airline must increase
revenues to offset increased costs. However, the regulatory environment
makes it difficult to raise fares. Therefore, the airline increases revenues
by increasing the number of people on each flight. It flies fuller planes.
Because the passengers do not pay the price increase , their demand is constant.
The net result is the same number of passengers acconodated on fewer, ful-
ler flights. If F is large enough, the airlines will fly full planes, maxi-
mizing efficiency and minimizing congestion.
Passenger Surcharge - If the congestion toll is directly assessed on
the passengers as a surcharge (H), the situation changes. Now the perceived
cost of the transportation increases for the passenger and demand will fall.
But as far as the airlines are concerned, H does not affect the costs of
a flight and they will continue to operate at the same inefficient break-even
load factor. Although the number of flights will decrease as demand decreases
and delay is less severe, the imposition of the passenger surcharge in a
* See de Neufville and Mira for details.
fixed-ticket price environment cannot lead to an efficient solution. [6]*
In conclusion, both Park and de Neufville and Mira point out that
in a fixed-ticket price environment, it is always better to impose a congestion
toll and impose that toll on flights rather than on the passengers.
Landing fees on aircraft are socially desirable and head
taxes are not. We would thus endorse the policy of higher
landing fees at peak hours instituted by the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey in 1968, and more recently by the
British Airports Authority. The departure taxes on passengers
such as those instituted by several American airports from 1972
on or the International Departures Noise tax in Paris do not
optimize the air transport system whatever tteir immediate con-
venience to the taxing authorities may be.[7
*The airline's response is constrained by the model's assumption of a fixed-
capacity aircraft. In reality, an airline faced with a congestion toll charged
to its flights would still increase load-factor. But at some point it would
introduce larger planes rather than further decrease frequency. Thus, the
model overstates the reductions in frequency and in delay.
Conversely, if the surcharge were placed on the passenger, demand would fall.
But at some point the airline would switch to smaller planes rather than
further decrease frequency. Again, the model overstates the reductions in
frequency and in delay.
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IV. MEASUREMENT OF TIME-DEPENDENT CONGESTION COSTS
Marginal delay costs are defined as the total congestion costs that
an additional user of an airport imposes on other users of the facility.
The computation is based on the theory that
during a period when an airport is continuously busy, each
user imposes some delayon all following users until the end
of the busy period. That is, an additional user shoves those
following him one space back in the ueue and the effect
persists until the queue dissipates. 1] (Emphasis added.)
These costs are a function of the type of operation, the time
needed for each type of operation, the mix of different types of opera-
tions, the costs of delay for each type of operation and the total
number of operations during the busy period.* That is, for a particular
type of use, j, at time, tthe marginal delay cost, D., is
Dj = s (pNc, + p2Nc2 + ... + pkNck) (16)
or
k
D. =s .N i2 pic. (17)
*3l 3 i=l
or
D. = s Nc (18)
* The discussion draws heavily on the pioneering work of Carlin and
Park, based on their 1969 analysis of congestion delays at the New
York airports.[l]
where
i = an index for each type of operation (an air carrier
landing and a general aviation landing are each dif-
ferent types of operations)
k = the number of different types of operations at the airport
s = length of time in minutes needed to provide service
for an operation of type i
N = total number of operations that take place from time t
until the end of the busy period
pi= proportion of total operations of type i at time t
c= cost per minute of delay for each type of operation i
c = p c1 + p2c2 + ..pkck = average total cost per minute
of delay for the mix of operations at the airport at
time t.
In other words, the total marginal cost of an operation of type
j at time t equals the delay caused by that operation (the time required
to service that operation, s.) times the cost per minute for all the
aircraft behind operation j in the queue.
Now, if
N- B (19)
S
where
B total time from t to the end of the busy period
= Plsl+P2s2 + . + pksk = average length of time
needed to provide service
to a user for the mix of
operations at the airport
at time t
then
sj B (20)D (t =_
s
which makes explicit the dependence of the marginal delay costs on the
time of day, t. This is necessary because the length of a busy period,
B, changes with the time of day (B is naturally longer during peak-demand
periods). Also, the average delay cost per minute, c, and the average
duration of service time, s, are functions of the traffic mix, pi, which
changes with the time of day.
Equation 20 is valid even where the service times and the delay
costs for each type of operation are random variables with known proba-
bility density functions, f (s) and f c(c), as is the case in practice.
1 1
All that is needed is to modify the definitions of s i and c. to be the
expected service time and the expected delay cost per minute for opera-
tions of type i.
Carlin and Park used actual measurements of B, i, c, and s i obtained
at New York City's airports to compute the marginal delay costs D.(t)
through Equation 20. They identified four types of operations (air car-
rier landings,aircarrier takeoffs, general aviation landings, and
general aviation takeoffs). For each type of operation, they estimated
D (t) for each of the 24 hours of the day. For instance, they claimed
that the marginal delay costs imposed by an air carrier landing between
4 and 5 p.m. at La Guardia Airport amounted to $963 in 1967, whereas the
marginal delay costs associated with ageneral aviation takeoff during the
same hour were $443. [2]
The work of Yance, conducted during approximately the same period
(1967-1969) as Carlin and Park's, takes a different approach.[3] Yance's
main interest lies in determining the relative landing fees for general avia-
tion and commercial aircraft (or, in general, the relative magnitude of landing
fees for different types of airport users). Yance's basic premise is that
the time for a particular movement has an "opportunity cost" because "an
increase in the movement rate of one type must be accompanied by a decrease
in the movement rate of another type" if the average delay at an airport is
not to be increased. He concludes that a rational way to determine the
relative magnitude of the opportunity costs associated with two different
types of operations is to determine what could be called the "rate of substi-
tution" of one type of movement for the other. This rate of substitution is
the ratio of the service times for the two types of movements. Thus the
relative landing fees for different types of operations, i and j, should
be in the ratio of s. to s . This is the same result as that obtained by
Carlin and Park because, from Equation 20
D.(t) s.
= - 1 (21)
D (t) s.
Therefore, once the marginal delay costs, D (t), for one type of
user, j, have been determined, the marginal delay costs for different
users (i = 1, 2, ... k; i # j) can be determined through Equation 21.
Yance has correctly pointed out by reference to the Airport Capacity
Handbook that the ratios s./s. change with the overall mix of traffic
at different airports. This is because the service time required for
the movement of a given aircraft often depends on the type of aircraft
that has immediately preceded it and this, in turn, often depends on the air-
craft mix at a particular airport.*
The mathematical tools for computing marginal delay costs have greatly
improved since the late 1960s. Whereas Carlin and Park had to resort
to imprecise and complicated data sources to estimate the variables**
necessary to compute D (t), it is now possible to compute marginal delay
costs by using theoretical considerations and a minimum amount of readily
available data. For instance, Hengsbach and Odoni have recently developed
a package of computer programs that can accomplish this at little cost
and with considerable precision. [5] Their approach is based on the earlier
theoretical work of Koopman on time-dependentqueues.[6] Using only infor-
mation on the demand rate, the traffic mix and the service capacity at
a given airport, numerous queuing statistics can be computed as a function
of time of day. Marginal delay costs can then be estimated by modifying
airport demand to include "additional users" at the desired times of the
day.
The technique has not yet reached the level of refinement where
marginal delay costs for different types of movements (e.g. an air car-
rier departure, a general aviation landing, etc.) can be computed. In-
stead a single marginal delay cost is obtained for an "average" additional
operation taking place at any specific time, t. From this, however, it
* As an example of this, take the case of the landing of a small general
aviation aircraftunder IFR conditions. If the.preceding landing aircraft
is also a general aviation airplane, the required in-trail separation
between the two aircraft is 3 n. miles. If the preceding aircraft is
a wide-body jet,a 5 or 6 n. mile separation is required due to the wake-
vortex danger.
** It is especially difficult to obtain field data about the duration -of
busy periods, B, at different times of the day. These difficulties
were described in detail by Carlin and Park.
is then possible to.compute "operation-specific" marginal delay costs from
the relative length of service times for different types of operations,
through Equation 21.
The results of the various studies on delay costs can be sunmnarized as
follows.
First, the marginal delay costs due to operations at peak traffic hours
are sizable in absolute terms. Carlin and Park estimate a marginal delay
cost of approximately $1,000 for each air carrier operation at La Guardia during
the peak afternoon hours (for 1967 traffic levels). Hengsbach and Odoni
estimate the marginal delay cost for a similar operation at Boston's Logan
International Airport (for 1970 traffic levels) at $175. About 50% ($500)
of the Carlin and Park figure is the imputed cost to airline passengers of
the extra delay, whereas the $175 figure of Hengsbach and Odoni does not
include any passenger delay costs. This explains part of the difference be-
tween the two figures. In addition, La Guardia is a much more congested air-
port than Logan International (and was especially so in 1967).
Second, the variations in marginal delay costs within the course of a day
are very large. Both Carlin and Park and Hengsbach and Odoni found an ap-
proximate 10 to 1 ratio between the size of marginal delay costs during the
peak evening hours and the same costs during the "slack" mid-day (11 - 12 a.m.,
noon - 1 p.m., etc.) hours. That is, marginal delay costs during low demand
periods amount to only about 10% of the peak-hour marginal delay costs.* In
general, the exact relationship between peak and off-peak costs will depend
* During the very low utilization hours at major airports (usually
between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m.) marginal delay costs are equal to zero,
for all practical purposes.
on the detailed shape of the demand profile for the 24-hour period.
Third-; Carlin and Park estimated that the marginal delay costs for
general aviation movements are 'about 50% of the equivalent costs for air
carrier movements. Yance found that this percentage can be anywhere from
42% to 85%, depending on the mix of traffic at each airport.
Fourth, current U.S. landing fees, which are solely based on aircraft
weight, rarely exceed $150 for a medium size commercial jet (e.g. a B-727)
and $20 for general aviation aircraft. These fees do not vary with time
of day. Thus, the adoption of a landing fee system based on marginal delay
costs would be a radical departure from existing practices and prices. Immediate
effects would be a sizable increase in landing fees for peak-hour operations
and an even steeper increase (percentage-wise) in landing fees for general
aviation aircraft using major runways at major airports during peak traffic
hours.
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V. PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE THEORY
The basic arguments in favor of a time-varying structure of airport
fees and some general policy guidelines (for example, fees should be pro-
portional to the magnitude of the marginal delay costs) for setting these
fees are well understood. As discussed in Section IV, methods exist to ac-
curately compute delay and marginal delay costs for any given capacity-to-
demand relationship at any given airport. Current pricing policies at con-
gested airports are far from optimal from the standpoint of economic efficiency.
The next natural step should be to establish price structures that
specify airport usage fees by type of operations and by time of day. Such
fees would maximize the net benefits that society derives from existing airport
facilities. Unfortunately, there are a number of factors that immensely
complicate the determination of such a price structure, ranging from analytical
difficulties to questions of policy toward specific segments of aviation.
(There may be valid policy reasons not to seek economic efficiency as a
primary goal.)
Determination of Equilibrium Prices
Although models exist to estimate the marginal delay costs associated with
any given flight demand and capacity profiles, there is no guarantee (in fact,
it is highly unlikely) that setting congestion tolls equal to the marginal
delay costs under any given status Quo will lead to equilibrium conditions.
If a high fee equal to the current marginal delay costs were imposed on opera-
tions conducted at peak traffic hours at a specific airport, at least some of
the peak hour operations would move to off-peak hours to avoid the surcharge.
This would lower marginal delay costs at peak demand periods, and conversely
r'aise marginal delay costs at off-peak periods. Runway usage fees would then
have to be readjusted (lowered at peak hours and increased at off-peak
hours) thus luring back some of the operations that were previously driven
away. This sequence could continue ad infinitum unless some means of computing
equilibrium prices exist.
This problem has been succinctly described by Carlin and Park.
One of the difficulties in making estimates of marginal
costs with the intention of using them as prices is to allow
for the effects that the prices themselves will have on
runway use. Use of the full marginal delay costs, for example,
to determine peak hour surcharges for the use of runways would
not represent equilibrium conditions because their use would
reduce the number of airplanes using the airport, thereby
reducing marginal costs and hence the prices that should be
charged. If instituted immediately, such a pricing system
would be less than optimally efficient by overly reducing
traffic. It might even be dynamically unstable, in the sense
that costs recomputed in succeeding periods and used as prices
might not converge to an equilibrium level. This would be the
case if, after full marginal delay cost prices were imposed,
traffic decreased so much that marginal costs fell below the
level of current landing fees. Using these lower costs as
prices during the following period would result in traffic
above current levels, and undamped oscillations in prices and
traffic would ensue.
Using full marginal costs as prices without adjustment would
clearly be unwise. On the other hand, to determine analytically
a set of equilibrium prices would be an impossible task. To
do so, we would need to know with some confidence and precision
what the pattern of traffic would be under different sets of
prices. We do not.ll]* (Emphasis added.)
In short, there is no information on the sensitivity of airport demand to
changes in runway usage charges. And without this information, the effects of
any specific price structure on the pattern of demand for airport operations
cannot be predicted. None of the mathematical models reviewed considers demand
elasticity, even at the theoretical level. They assume uniform demand which
ignores the relationship between the number of operations at peak and off-
peak periods and the respective levels of runway charges during these periods.
* Terminology has been slightly edited for consistency.
This is one of the most fundamental deficiencies of the analytical work
that exists to date.
Network Effects
The air transport system requires a complex network of facilities which
are often interdependent. Congestion at any one airport cannot be considered
in isolation but must be analyzed with due consideration to congestion at all
other airports with which this airport is linked. It is conceivable that
pricing systems developed separately for two interconnected airports would cancel
out each other's intended beneficial effects. Ideally, therefore, airport
price structures should be determined for networks of airports rather than for
each single airport in isolation, which requires a degree of complexity far
beyond current analytical models and techniques.
On the other hand, one can argue that no major airport receives an over-
whelming fraction of its flights from any single source and, consequently,
that the interdependence is loose enough to permit examining each airport
separately. Neither position can be proved or disproved at the present time.
However, the interconnection of airports cannot be dismissed so easily
from an individual airline's point of view. Because of the need for high
aircraft utilization, existing airline scheduling patterns are relatively
insensitive to isolated changes in landing fees. Changing the arrival or
departure time for a given flight at any particular airport would mean changing
flight times at all other airports that the aircraft serves-- not to mention
the "ripple effects" on all the connecting or "feeder" flights by other air-
craft which may have been set to conform with the first aircraft's schedule.
However, this is consistent with the concept of marginal cost pricing.
The example implicitly states that an airline may be willing to pay a high fee
for the privilege of having its aircraft land and take off at a particular time
at a specific airport. Another airline or a general aviation user who does
not place such a high value on the time of a flight to the same airport
would not-pay the high fee but would use a different facility or fly at a
different time. The result would be less congestion and improved utiliza-
tion at the airport in question.
However, the main point cannot be ignored: to predict an airline's
response to a time-varying price structure at a particular airport, the reper-
cussions of each possible change on the complete schedule of the airline must
be considered. It is unlikely that an airport planner or airport economist
can make these estimates.* Therefore, knowledge about an airline's elasticity
to runway fee changes will probably be uncertain for a long time to come. And,
as a result, the impact of price structures on an airline's behavior can be
determined in only an approximate manner rather than be estimated from specific
hard information.**
Recovery of Facility Costs
The analysis of time-varying runway fees that would maximize social bene-
fits did not place any minimum acceptable limits on the total revenues that
airport authorities should collect from such fees. Yet such minimum accept-
able limits do exist in practice because the airport must recover at least
some of its maintenance, operation and construction costs. Although the degree
of expected recovery varies widely not only from one country to another but
also from location to location within countries (especially in the United States),
*It is even unlikely that the scheduling staff of an airline can perform
this task with any degree of accuracy.
**It is important to note that this statement applies primarily to scheduled
airline flights. Charter and general aviation movements which are not as
sensitive to system effects should be more responsive to price changes. This
is borne out by the case studies in Section VI.
there is a basic policy in developed countries that major commercial
airports must be more or less self-supporting economically.* This has
several consequences for pricing structures.
First, the minimum amount is usually substantial in absolute terms.
It is, therefore, entirely possible that the airport's basic need could
exceed the amount collected under a marginal delay cost pricing policy
designed to optimize the social utility of the airport. Optimality may
in fact be precluded because the landing fees needed for financial support
are too high and eliminate flights that would have taken place if charged
only for marginal delay costs.
Second, it is very difficult to determine what the long-term costs
are that must be attributed to and recovered from airside users. For in-
stance, if one of the airport's goals is to accumulate resources for future
expansion and improvements, it must know what such future changes will be
and what they will cost. However, in most cases this information is unknown
because future expansion plans are contingent on future airport demand (which
in turn is affected by the very set of usage fees that have to be determined).
In the United States this difficulty is bypassed, as a rule, by requiring
recovery after the fact; after a facility has been built, its users pay fees
* In Great Britain the mandate for self-support is spelled out clearly with
specifications of annual rates of return,etc. In France and Germany,
airports strive for self-sufficiency but usually receive heavy, direct
subsidies from the government. In the United States, statutes vary widely
from location to location, but the net effect is that airports are usually
self-supporting, at least in the sense that they pay for their own con-
struction, maintenance and operation costs. This is not to say that air-
ports do not receive very substantial indirect subsidies. In the United
States, for instance, these subsidies include low-cost funds from Federal,
state and local governments; assumption of all air-traffic-control-related
expenditures by the FAA; exemption from land-use rents or taxes by cities
or local governments, etc.
that amortize the cost of the facility over the estimated span of its useful
lifetime.*^
Third, the proper way of'allocating facility costs among users is very
controversial. Presumably, if marginal cost pricing is to be the norm, each
user must pay for the additional "wear and tear" (marginal short-term costs)
and the additional construction costs (marginal long-term costs) caused by his
use of the airport. But, of course, it is practically impossible to really
determine what these marginal costs are.** The present system of computing
landing fees, primarily based on aircraft weight, can be viewed as an attempt
to deal in a practical way with the problem of charging for marginal facility
costs. Marginal facility costs and related issues have been discussed at
length by Eckert, [2] Levine,[ 3] and Little and McLeod 43 and will not be con-
sidered further.
There is, however, another interpretation of weight-based fees which,
although not central to the discussion in this section, is directly related to
airport congestion. Airside facilities have very high initial (i.e. construc-
tion) costs, but once the runways and taxiways are constructed, the costs
caused by an additional operation at the airport are close to zero. As long as
the facility is underutilized, it is to the airport's advantage to invite
additional users to the facility, increasing revenues. They do this through a
discriminatory price structure based on willingness or ability to pay. In this
* Unfortunately, this method of cost recovery provides no advance indication of
what additional facilities and how much expansion present users would be wil-
ling to pay for. The user is confronted with the increased costs only'after
new facilities have been built.
** As an example, the favorite argument of general aviation proponents in this
respect goes something like this: "Why should a small private airplane
landing on a 10,000 foot runway pay for all 10,000 feet? This airplane only
needs 3,000 feet. The only reason for the extra 7,000 feet is that air
carriers need it. Let them, then, pay the full costs of the extra 7,000 feet
plus the cost of the reinforced pavement, extra width, etc." To which the
air carriers usually respond: "In this case, why do you use the 10,000 foot
runway at all?" This is only the beginning of a prolonged and often heated
debate.
context, aircraft weight is a proxy for willingness or ability to pay: a
light, general aviation aircraft whose operator cannot presumably afford a
large runway fee is, in this way, charged much less than a comnercial jet.
While this pricing policy may be appropriate for underutilized and
uncongested airports, it is counterproductive for congested facilities. By
pricing the facility according to aircraft weight, it effectively encourages
those users who are less willing to pay full costs and who, at least on the
average, contribute less "transportation value" per operation to society as
a whole. In fact, the only deterrent to airport use under present weight-
based systems is the prospect of delay at a congested airport. Thus, a user
who is able to tolerate his own delay will use the airport without considering
the delay costs that he imposes on others.*
Reluctance to Change
Pricing based on marginal delay costs, in its pure form, charges each
airport user with the costs that user imposes on others. An airplane
landing at a busy commercial airport during a peak traffic hour could be
charged $1,000 or more, depending on the level of congestion and the mix of
traffic at the airport.**
Such a pricing system clearly does not consider the "ability to pay"
of the user. Whereas a $1,000 charge may be a small percentage of the total
revenues of an inter-continental flight of a B-747 jet, it would exceed the
total revenue of most commuter carrier flights. In other words, marginal-
delay cost pricing could result in a schedule of charges which may be hard
(or impossible) for certain kinds of aviation or types of flights to pay.
* As discussed in Section II.
** As discussed in Section IV.
General aviation flights would feel the impact of marginal delay cost pricing
most severely. Flights of regional and "third level" (commuter) carriers
and, to a lesser extent, short-haul flights by trunk carriers would also be
strongly affected. In short, marginal cost pricing would most likely eliminate
flights for which airport fees represent a sizable percentage of the value of
the flight to the aircraft operator.
Although this is the purpose of marginal cost pricing - to eliminate
those to whom the value of using the airport is less than the costs they impose
on others - the imposition of fees without consideration of ability to pay is
such a drastic departure from prevailing practices that it may appear to be dis-
criminatory and unfair. Those users who have relied on the traditional low
cost policies and who have developed vested interests in their continuation are
the major impediment to the adoption of marginal cost pricing at congested
airports.
Likewise, airport administrators can hardly be expected to adopt in one
single step pricing policies which are so different from the ones they have been
accustomed to and with which they have had long experience. Their reluctance
in this respect could be increased by apprehension regarding the exact nature
of short and long-term reactions to the new policies by the various aviation
interest and pressure groups. In addition, the inability of analysts and of
economic theory to determine in advance equilibrium pricing schedules and to
forecast the precise effects of marginal cost pricing on airport usage ra.ises
some financial risks that could result from a departure from present practices.
To evaluate the potential economic (and political) risks and the possible
benefits of peak hour pricing, actual experience and not theory is needed.
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VI. PEAK HOUR PRICING IN PRACTICE
Although the theory of peak hour pricing as a tool to spread demand
away from periods of congestion has received a great deal of attention in
the economic and technical literatures, the theory has only been applied in a
few instances, and only a fraction of these experiments have been documented.
Fortunately, two of the best documented cases are airports which have
imposed peak hour charges to al-leviate congestion. Of these, the experience
of the British Airports Authority at Heathrow is the most complicated and
least understoodin this country. The other airport application is the
peak hour general aviation surcharge imposed by the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey.
The London Case Study
In the United States, most commercial airports are owned and operated
by local governments or authorities. Few control more than one facility.
In contrast, the British Airports Authority (BAA) is the major airport
operator in the United Kingdom.
The Role of the British Airports Authority
The BAA is a nationalized service enterprise established in 1965. It owns
and manages seven of the United Kingdom's 27 major airports (Heathrow, Gatwick
and Stansted, in southeast England near London; and Prestwick, Edinburgh,
Aberdeen and Glasgow in Scotland). These seven airports handle 75% of the
United Kingdom's passenger and cargo traffic.J1
Under legislative mandate, the government expects the BAA to pay taxes
and to earn an average return on its net assets. For the nine year period
1965/1966* to 1974/1975, the average return has been 13.28%. The target
for 1973/1974 to 1975/1976 is 15.5%. This was exceeded the first year (16.15%),
but the return dropped to 11.47% in 1974/1975.[2]
During 1974/1975 the BAA's overall operating profit was $20,644,000.
(All numbers in this section of this report are based on a conversion rate of
$2 to the pound.) The profits from Heathrow and Gatwick were $21,438,000 and
$836,000 respectively, offsetting the loss of $1,630,000 at the other four
airports operated by the BAA at the time. [3]
All airports lost money on traffic-related operations - prdvision of
fire and ambulance equipment; construction and maintenance of runways, taxi-
ways and aprons; the construction and maintenance of passenger terminal areas;
and operation of ramps, gates and apron areas. (In the U.S., these facilities
are usually operated and controlled by the airlines under long term leases
with the airport operator.) The revenues derived from landing fees and apron,
ramp and other service charges were insufficient to offset the operating costs.
In contrast, all airports made money on connercial operations - trading
concessions, rents, services and admission fees. At Heathrow alone, commercial
operations netted $22,644,000 while traffic operations lost $1,206,000. In
1973/1974 both produced profits of $20,524,000 and $5,184,000 respectively. [4]
The Role of the Civil Aviation Authority
Air traffic control and terminal navigation are the responsibility of
the National Air Traffic Services (NATS), a part of the Civil Aviation Authority
* BAA's fiscal year runs from April 1 of one year to March 31 of the next.
(CAA). The CAA is roughly equivalent to a combination of the United States
Federal Aviation Administration and Civil Aeronautics Board. But unlike U.S
agencies, the CAA is an independent public body, separate from the government.
Under its enabling legislation, the CAA is expected "to recover, as soon as
possible, the whole of its costs, and a return on capital... .The Authority
should formulate its financial plans with a view of dispensing with [government
subsidy] by 1977/1978.1[5]
In 1974/1975, the CAA lost $79,288,000 on operations before subsidy.
Enroute navigation services accounted for $54,666,000 of the loss. Although
the CAA would like to increase fees to offset this loss, it cannot because the
enroute fee system is subject to international control through Eurocontrol.
The CAA does control fees for terminal navigation services, however, and these
can be expected to be increased to offset a $10,610,000 loss for these services
in 1974/1975. [6]
Heathrow Operations
Compared to other major airports of the world, Heathrow ranked 5th in air
transport operations (267,726), 14th in aircraft movements (289,937), 6th in
terminal passengers (20,337,289), and 4th in cargo tonnage (460,827 metric
tons) in 1974/1975.[7]
Because of its high traffic levels and rather limited facilities (two
parallel main runways with a shorter, interfering diagonal runway), Heathrow
operations experienced air traffic congestion many years ago. In response, the
air traffic control authority (now NATS) imposed operational quotas (a "slot"
system) during the 1960's. Although the quotas have been increased over the
years, they are still basically determined by the physical capacity of the run-
way system. The current levels are 73 operations per hour at peak and 68
41
operations per hour sustained.* There are also 5 and 10 minute quotas to keep
demand evenl-y spaced throughout the hour. The system is in effect all the time.
Peak demand occurs midday-'(see Figure 2). It has decreased from its 1973
high, but still approaches maximum capacity. International departures westbound
are the major component of this peak.
Figure 2
Percentage of Arrival, Departure, and Total Air Transport Movements Handled in
Each Hour of an Average Busy Day at Heathrow
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Slots are assigned twice a year by a scheduling comnittee composed of
airline representatives. The allocations are based on historical patterns
and bids for new slots. There has been a tendency for airlines to ask for
more slots than are actually available but to then use fewer slots than '
assigned, creating some excess capacity. Neither the BAA nor the CAA par-
ticipates in the slot allocation process.[8
*Heathrow has a capacity of 90 operations per hour based on U.S. standards.
The difference is almost entirely due to the smaller separation distance
, between aircraft used in the United States.
Landing Fees at Heathrow
Both the BAA and the CAA charge a fee at Heathrow. The CAA's navigation
charge is based on weight andis currently about $1.15 per metric ton or $1.05
per short ton. Domestic flights within the U.K. pay about 15% less.['] This
fee is for landings only and is billed and collected by the BAA for the CAA.
Figure 3
Percentage of Arrival, Departure, and Total Passenger Traffic Handled in
Each Hour of an Average Busy Day at Heathrow
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SOURCE: BAA Aviation Statistical Service. Patterns of Traffic at the British
Airports Authority Airports - 1974 (March, 1975).
Prior to 1971, the BAA also used a traditional weight-based landing fee
formula. At that time, faced with ever-increasing congestion and peaking in
the terminals (see Figure 3), access roads, etc., the BAA decided that "some-
thing ought to be done" about the congestion problem. Although the landing
fee was still primarily considered as a way of raising revenues, the BAA
recognized its potential as a tool for spreading demand and allocating costs
more equi tably.
To sum up our policy on landing charges, we felt it
was wrong to continue with our old system in current conditions
and in the conditions we will be facing over the next few years
of increasing pressure of traffic demand at peak times. It would
be wrong to charge exactly the same fee for an aircraft landing
at off-peak times, when costs occasioned by the landing are very
low, as at peak times, when the costs occasioned by landing and
take-off are very high. Similarly, it would be wrong to charge
an aircraft with very few passengers on board the same fee as a
fully loaded aircraft. [10]
Three points about the BAA's decision must be emphasized. First, it
was philosophical and not based on financial needs. Second, although the
system was originally planned as a means of controlling air traffic congestion,
landside considerations have grown in relative importance over the past few
years. Third, although the theoretical basis for peak charges was understood,
no expensive analytical studies, models or forecasts were made to support
the BAA's decision. To this date , the landing fee system and its modifications
have been approached pragmatically in a spirit of "let's make a change and see if
it moves us in the right direction." [l1]
In 1972, the landing fee was modified to include a weight element, a
distance element and a per passenger element. In addition, a surcharge was
imposed that varies with season and time of the day. The surcharge applies
to take-offs as well as landings (the landing fee only applies to landings) and
is based on the actual not the scheduled time of operation. Because the BAA
already monitors traffic movements for gate assignment purposes, there is little
additional administrative cost imposed for monitoring actual operation times.
The distance element is based on the ultimate origin or destination of the
flight, not its prior or next stop. Three zones were defined - domestic,
*
European and international - that roughly defined short, medium and long range.
*There are some obvious distortions in this system - e.g. London-Paris is a
short flight but would still be classified as European. However, this classi-
fication system was chosen for its ease of implementation.
The ratio of charges is one to two to four for domestic to European to inter-
national. This is based on a value-of-service pricing concept. The longer
the flight, the greater the revenues and the lower the sensitivity to higher
landing charges.
The per passenger charge also varies with distance and is based on the
actual number of people deplaned (transit passengers are not charged). The
airlines are required to report this data anyway, so there is no additional burden
imposed. Table 1 lists the weight, distance and passenger charges effective
November 1, 1975.[12] This basic charge is in effect 24 hours per day through-
out the year. Table 2 lists some representative landing fees applying the
current rate structure and lists the charges at Paris and Frankfurt as
comparisons. [13]
Table 1
British Airports Authority Landing Fees for Aircraft
Over 16 Metric Tons (November 1, 1975)
Ultimate Per Metric Ton (Dollars) Per Terminal
Origin or (First 50 tons) (Thereafter) Passenger
Destination (Dollars)
Domestic .70 .90 .70
European 1.40 1.80 1.20
Interenti nental 2.80 3.60 2.40
Peak Movement Surcharge
Whereas the distance and weight related charges are based on a value -
of-service concept, the peak movement surcharge is based on a cost-of-service
concept. It is an attempt to pass on congestion costs to those creating the
congestion.
Table 2
Typical Landing Fees at Heathrow and Other European Airports, Excluding Surcharge.
(November 1, 1975)
(Dollars)
Flight Aircraft BAA CAA Total Paris
Classifi- Weight Passen- Navi- Charge 1/1/75 FrankfurtCati ger gation (includes 1/11/74cation IChare Chare 
-
Domestic Trident 3B
69 ts 49.40 63.00 69.00 181.40 332.22 307.1469 tons
90 pass.
European Trident 3B
69 tons 104.20 108.00 80.04 292.24 593.44 577.94
90 pass.
Intercon- B707/300
tinental 153 tons 510.80 264.00 177.48 952.28 1,085.88 1,034.56
110 pass.
Intercon- B747
'tinental 325 tons
185 pass. 1130.00 444.00 377.00 1,951.00 2,235.38 2,023.42
The surcharge was first introduced for the 1972 summer season. It was
intentionally small at first to "get the airlines accustomed to the idea".[14]
The intent was to review the charge periodically and to modify it as revenue
needs and congestion patterns changed.
The initial charge was £ 20 (about $50 at the time)* and applied to all
operations: take-offs as well as landings. The charge applied for 4 hours
each day, between 8:00 and 11:59 a.m. In May and June, 1972, it only applied
Monday through Friday. From July through early October, it was in effect
seven days a week. In total, the charge applied on 150 days for a total of
600 hours. [15]
* Data in this section will be given in pounds for consistency because the
'exchange rate has varied over this time period.
- Table 3
Heathrow Peak Operation Surcharges for 1974
Although the original intent had been to adjust the charge for the summer
of 1973, a price freeze was in effect. Therefore, both the level of the
charge and its period of application were the same in 1973 as in 1972.
In the fall of 1973, the BAA reviewed both the effects of the surcharge
to date and its latest traffic growth forecasts. As a result, the surcharge
schedule for 1974 was modified to apply on more days and to vary during the
daily surcharge period. The pattern is summarized in Table 3 and
Figure 4. [16]
The £50 "super peak" surcharge was in effect on 214 days and
for 612 hours, while the £20 "shoulder" surcharge applied on 321 days for
642 hours.
Month Time of Day Charge
April, 1974 8:00-8:59 am £20
(7 days a week) 9:00-10:59 am £ 50
11:00-11:59 am £20
May-October, 1974 8:00-8:59 am L 20
(7 days a week) 9:00-11:59 am L 50
12:00-12:59 pm 1 20
Nov. 1974-March, 1975
(Monday-Friday only) 9:00-10:59 am 1 20
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Figure 4
Heathrow Peak Hour Surcharges for 1974
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This surcharge pattern was expected to generate excessive revenues.
Therefore, an offsetting reduction in the standard weight related charge
was made so that overall income would not be affected. But because of
the high inflation rate in 1974-1975, retrospectively this was a mistake
as overall revenues fell. Therefore, in keeping with the BAA's pragmatic
adjustment policy, a 35% general increase was made in April, 1975, raising the
charges to L67.50 at the super peak and £27 on the shoulder.[18] Revenues still
lagged and an additional 15% general increase was made on November 1, 1975,
and the full summer peak and shoulder pattern was extended to April. Table
4 shows the current surcharge structure. 1 9]
Table 4
Heathrow Peak Operation Surcharges
Effective November 1, 1975
Month Time of Day Charge
April - October 8:00-8:59 am L 30
9:00-11:59 am L80
12:00-12:59 pm £30
November - March
(Monday - Friday only) 9:00-10:59 am £30
Note that thei80 super peak surcharge, at a cpnversion rate of $2 per
pound would represent an increase of 87% over the basic landing fee for a
domestic flight, 55% for a European flight, 15% for an intercontinental 707
flight and only 7% for an intercontinental 747 flight (based on the data
from Table 2). This effect would be doubled if the flight both arrives and
departs during the peak period, because the surcharge is applied to all opera-
tions, not just landings.
Impact on Traffic
Although the surcharge did represent a significant additional charge to
general aviation traffic, this segment was already severely rationed during
busy hours by the NATS slot system. The relatively low surcharge in effect
during 1972 and 1973 was not expected to have much impact on airline
traffic levels. The results were encouraging however. During 1972, total
aircraft traffic increased 0.8% over the 150 days the surcharge was in effect.
But traffic during the four hour surcharge period decreased 1.7%. During
1973, overall traffic for the same 150 day period rose 6%, but traffic during
the surcharge hours rose only 2.4%. The percentage of the total.traffic that
moved during the four hour surcharge period fell from 28.4% in 1971 to
26.7% in 1973. This data is summarized in Table 5.[20]
Table 5
Heathrow Aircraft Movements on 150 Summer Days
Before and After Peak Surcharge Introduced in 1972
Total Charge from Movements Charge from % Traffic
Movements Prior Year During Prior Year Moving
Peak During Peak
1971 126,411- 35,928 28.4%
1972 127,446 +0.8% 35,301 -1.7% 27.7%
1973 135,264 +6.1% 36,152 +2.5% 26.7%
With the higher surcharge instituted in 1974 and its longer period of
application, more substantial shifts were expected. However, quite the
reverse took place. While overall traffic fell 3.9%, traffic during the
super peak period increased 1.1% overall. Traffic during the shoulder periods
fell 6.6%.~ The percentage of traffic moving during the super peak rose from
19.6% in 1973 to 20.6% in 1974, and the percentage moving during the combined
super peak and shoulder period rose from 33.8% to 34.4%. This data is sum-
marized in Table 6.[21]
Table 6
Heathrow Aircraft Movements on 214 Summer Days
Before and After Surcharge Modified in 1974
% Traffic
Movements % Traffic Movements % Traffic Moving During1
Total During Moving During During Moving During Peak and
Movements Peak Peak Shoulder Shoulder Shoulder
1973 188,809 36,928 19.6% 26,865 14.2% 33.8%
1974 181,501 37,341 20.6% 25,098 13.8% 34.4%
Change
from -3.9% +1.1% +5.1% -6.6% -10.3% +1.8%
Prior
Year
Table 7 shows how the traffic mix changed from 1973 to 1974.[221
Table 7
Per Cent Change over Previous Year for Types of Traffic
Operating During Peak Surcharge Periods
During During
Super Peak Shoulder Total
Non-Air Transport -13.9% -25.0% -16.1%
Cargo - 5.6% - - 3.5%
European - 0.3% + 1.6% - 1.6%
Intercontinental + 2.3% -22.4% - 5.9%
Domestic + 8.6% - 3.7% + 1.8%
As might be expected, non-transport and cargo operations were most
affected. Europpan (medium haul) and intercontinental (long haul) were much
less affecied because the surcharge is a small percentage of their total cost.
However, domestic traffic, which should be more sensitive to increased costs,
actually showed the biggest increase in super peak operations!
The BAA hypothesizes that these unexpected results were brought on by
the fuel crisis. As airlines cut out marginal flights, overall traffic levels
fell. Remaining flights were consolidated at times of peak demand to
maximize load factors. The peak surcharge was too little to offset these
other factors. [23] It is also difficult to separate out several other effects
taking place during this time period: an increase in the number 'of ATC allocations
available per hour; normal schedule shifts for equipment or other reasons;
continued introduction of wide bodied aircraft; and general economic decline.
Latest data available (November, 1974 through February, 1975) indicates
that, as the fuel crisis slackened, the effects of the Winter surcharge were
more in line with normal expectations. Although overall traffic on. the 86
days during which the Winter surcharge applied increased 2.8%, traffic during
the peak only increased 0.5%. The percentage of peak traffic to total traffic
fell from 15.6% to 15.3%. Most of the change was probably due to the diversion
of non-transport traffic.[24]
Plans for the Future
Over the past five years, the major concern of the BAA has shifted from
runway and taxiway congestion to terminal and access congestion. As a result,
the pricing structure is being modified to reflect congestion costs due to
both aircraft and passenger peaking. As of December, 1975, a new system is
being proposed that not only assesses an aircraft movement surcharge as in the
past but also imposes a per passenger surcharge during the peak. There will no
longer be a passenger charge in the basic landing fee structure. In fact,
there will not be any per passenger charge during off-peak periods. During
the shoulder, there will be a per passenger charge of $1 for domestic operations
and $2 for all international operations -- European or other. During the
super peak these charges will be $2 and $4 per passenger respectively.
There will also be a weight-distance basic landing charge in effect at
all times. Unlike the current domestic-European-international break down, the
new system will be more closely related to actual distances. There will be
five zones -- domestic and international to 500 miles, to 2,000 miles, to 4,000
miles and to more than 4,000 miles. The peak hour surcharge per operation will
also be increased. As a result of this new structure, a long-haul international
flight will pay a 30% premium for an operation during the shoulder and a 60% premium
for an operation during the super peak. A short-haul international flight will
pay twice the basic fee during the shoulder and four times the basic fee during
the peak.[25]
Conclusion
The BAA has adopted a rational pricing scheme and a rational approach to
its implementation. The operational surcharge system, coupled with a weight-
distance basic landing fee structure, is a good compromise between economic marginal
pricing concepts and financial revenue requirements. Although there is some
data indicating that the surcharge is shifting demand slightly, it has not
resulted in any significant shifts because the surcharge component is still
small as compared to the basic landing fee. However, this is in keeping with
the BAA's basic pragmatic approach of starting low to get users accustomed
to the concept and then modifying the pricing scheme gradually as conditions
justify or require it. The BAA's experience during the next few years should
be closely followed because the surcharge is becoming a significant part of
the basic fee and airlines can be expected to react more strongly than in
the past.
Some caution should be used in extrapolating the BAA's experience to
the United States situation. First, the BAA's profit-oriented charter is alien
to what seems to be the prevailing U.S. philosophy that airports, as a public
service, should break even at best. Second, basic landing fees in Europe
are much higher than in the U.S. The imposition of the large surcharges that
may be needed to make the airlines sbift flights would be a great shock to U.S.
carriers accustomed to low fees and strong political protests can -be expected.
Third, the BAA's surcharge and landing fee systems work in conjunction with the NATS
operational quota system. Some care must be taken to separate the effects of one
from the other. Finally, the BAA's emphasis has been shifting from air traffic
congestion problems to terminal congestion concerns. The surcharge structure
that deals best with one problem may not be best for the other.
All things considered, the BAA's approach of gradual introduction and
change may be useful in the U.S. if a surcharge system is implemented.
It might both ease the shock of increased fees to the airlines and/or
minimize system disruption if the initial price structure is incorrect or
has unwanted effects.
The New York Case Study
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (formerly the Port of New
York Authority - PONYA) was established by a Compact between the two states in 1921
as a financially self-supporting agency to develop and operate terminal, trans-
portation and other facilities of commerce within the two-state Port of New
York District. [26]
The Authority operates the major commercial airports in the New
York City region - John F. Kennedy International, La Guardia and Newark Inter-
national.* It also operates Teterboro Airport in New Jersey as a general
aviation facility.**[28] As of December 31, 1974, the Port Authority had
invested $1,262,723,000,in its airports.[29]
The Port Authority has also assisted the New York Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Authority in developing Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, New York, and
Republic Airport on Long Island as major general aviation facilities.[30)
The Congestion Problem
Air traffic congestion at New York City's three major airports increased
through the early 1960's until, during the controller's slowdown of July, 1968,
* In 1947, the legislatures of the two states specifically authorized the
Port Authority to operate air terminals. It entered into long-term leases
with the City of New York that same year under which the Port Authority took
over the development and operation of La Guardia Airport (originally built
from 1937 to 1939) and! New York International Airport (opened in 1948 and
re-dedicated as John F. Kennedy International Airport in 1963). In 1948, the
Port Authority entered into a similar agreement with the City of Newark to
operate and develop Newark Airport (originally built in 1928) and the ad-
jacent Port Newark facilities.
** In 1949, Teterboro was purchased from a private owner. Starting in 1970, the
operation of Teterboro was assumed by Pan American World Airways under a 30
year agreement which precludes the use of Teterboro for any scheduled flights
other than helicopter service.
17% of all operations in the region (excluding Teterboro) were delayed by
more than 30 minutes (over 29% at Kennedy).[31] During that month, General
Aviation (GA) operations constituted 25% of the region's movements overall and
30% during peak hours (see Table 8 for distribution by airport).[32]
Table 8
General Aviation Percentage of
Total Movements - July, 1968
All Hours Peak
Region 25.0 30.0
Kennedy 16.6 20.7
La Guardia 32.1 34.4
Newark 29.6 36.2
To make more capacity available for air carrier operations, on August
1, 1968, the Port Authority imposed a $25 fee for all landings and take-
offs during peak hours by aircraft with less than 25 seats. This replaced
the normal $5 landing fee and was done with the
professed purpose of relieving congestion and achieving
maximum efficient operation at the three major airports
and with the professed intention of influencing General
Aviation operators to transfer their operations where
possible away from the runways and traffic control [33]patterns at the three major airports during peak periods....
This new minimum fee applied from 8:00 a.m. to 10;00 a.m. Monday through
Friday and from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. every day. Air taxi operators
providing scheduled connecting service at Kennedy and Newark could
obtain permits exempting them from the peak hour rates whenever they
used runways not in use by the scheduled airlines. This exemption
did not apply at La Guardia because there was little chance of non-
interfering runway use.[34
The impact of this surcharge was immediate. In August and September, GA
activity fell 19% overall and over 30% during the peak period. Historically,
GA traffic in these months stayed at the July level, so the decline was
directly related to the surcharge. Without it, the traffic levels might
have even increased as the controller slow down was phased out. This
information is summarized in Table 9.[35]
Table 9
General Aviation Percentage Decline
From July 1968
Decline in August Decline in September
(Based on 31 Day Month)
All Hours Peak Hours All Hours Peak Hours
Region -19 -31 -19 -32
Kennedy -7 -18 -11 -27
La Guardia -28 -41 -25 -37
Newark -17 -30 -17 -30
Table 10 gives the percentage of aircraft delayed by 30 minutes or more
for the same time period.[36] As might be expected, the improvement was
substantial.
Table 10
Percentage of Aircraft Delayed by 30 Minutes
or More - July, August, September, 1968
July August September
Region 17.0 14.1 7.6
Kennedy 29.4 27.1 12.2
La Guardia 12.0 5.2 4.6
Newark 2.8 2.8 3.4
Figure 5 shows the overall level of GA operations at the three airports
by month for 1967 and 1968.[37] In 1967, monthly operations averaged from
22,000 to 25,000 for the May to October period. 1968 levels exceeded 1967
through the Winter and Spring. They flattened out in July with the
controllers' slowdown, then fell 13% below the 1967 level for August and
22% below the 1967 level for September. In contrast, airline operations
increased over 8% for each month.[38]
Figure 6 shows the change in GA operations at La Guardia throughout the
day for an average day in July (before the surcharge) and in August and September,
1968 (after the surcharge).[39] Again, the reduced levels of operation are
significant. Prior to the surcharge there was a morning peak of 18-20 operations
per hour from about 9 a.m. to noon and an evening peak of 24-25 operations per
hour from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. In August, the pattern was totally altered. A peak
of about 15 operations per hour occurred between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. Operation
levels during what had been the afternoon peak period were less than 60%
of the July levels.*
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In September, traffic levels rose over August, but there were still 5
to 10 fewer operations per hour during the surcharge period than in July.
In all, there were five peaks in September: one in the middle of both the
morning and evening surcharge periods, one during the hour immediately fol-
lowing the morning surcharge period and one during both of the hours imme-
diately before and after the evening surcharge period.
Results at Kennedy and Newark were similar but less dramatic (Figure 7). 40)
The impact at Kennedy was least because air taxi operators, primarily com-
muter carriers, were a larger percentage of the GA activity (70% overall and
72% at peak versus 26% and 29% at La Guardia, 48% and 48% at Newark and 45%
and 46% for the region). E41 Because commuter carrier patterns are determined
by connecting schedules, there is less flexibility. However, 78% of the commuters
used non-duty runways in August and September compared with 52% in July, thus
avoiding the $25 surcharge.[42]
The Operation Allocation System
About the same time, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
gave notice of a proposed amendment to Part 93 of its regulations to designate
"High Density Traffic Airports" and to both limit and allocate operations
at those airports among classes of users. [43] The FAA felt that
"...the public interest in efficient, convenient, and
economical air transportation requires more effective
use of airport and airspace capacity. The authority to
regulate aircraft operations to reduce congestion is
clear. The plenary authority conferred by the Federal
Aviation Act to regulate the flight of aircraft to as-
sure the safe and efficient utilization of the'navigable
airspace is well established by practice and judicial
opinion." (Emphasis added.) [44)
This action was taken explicitly to provide relief from excessive
delays at the designated major terminals, to deal with the congestion
problem and with the problem of Air Traffic Controller workload and not
Figure 7
Aircraft General Aviation Movements - Average Day Before and After Surcharge (1 Aug., 1968)
Movements
July, 1968
15
Sept., 1968
Newark 10
5
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5
noon midnight
20- 20 Julyv. 1968
15 ~Aug.. 1968
Kennedy Sept. 1968
10
5
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5
midnightnoon
to correct a safety problem.[ 4 5] In support of its action, the FAA referred
to the Port Authority's fee system. [46] Although the fees were reducing
traffic levels, the FAA felt that "congestion would again reach serious
proportions unless additional restraints were placed on aircraft demand
for the use of airport facilities." [47]
Kennedy, Newark and La Guardia, along with O'Hare and Washington
National, were designated as "High Density Traffic Airports" under the
new regulations. At these airports, the number of operations (take-offs
and landings) under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) conditions Were limited
and allocated among air carriers, air taxis and "other," which would include
General Aviation. The allocations for the New York Airports aresummarized in
Table 11. [48]
Table 11
IFR Operations per Hour
Allocated at the New York Airports
Class of User Kennedy La Guardia Newark
Air Carrier Except 70(80*) 48 40
Air Taxi
Scheduled Air Taxi 5 6 10
Other 5 6 10
Total 80(90*) 60 60
*At Kennedy, the air carrier allocation was 80 operations between
5 and 8 p.m., increasing the total to 90 operations during those
hours.
The allocation of reservations among classes did not apply from mid-
night to 6 a.m. but the total hourly limit was still in effect. (Extra
sections of air carrier flights, other than air taxi, were exempt at
all times.) Any reservation allocated but not used by an air carrier
was available for scheduled air taxi operations. Any reservation allocated
but not used by an air carrier or scheduled air taxi was available for
other operations. [49] Under all conditions,iRRand VFR (Visual Flight
Rules which apply when minimum visibility requirements are met), all oper-
ations to or from these airports had to have an air traffic control (ATC)
arrival or departure reservation, except from midnight to 6 a.m.[50]
ATC could permit IFR operations above the limits if the operator obtained
an arrival or departure reservation in advance. ATC could grant this additional
reservation if the aircraft could be accomodated without significant additional
delays to the operations already allocated. [51]
The Impact on Traffic
The allocation system went into effect on June 1, 1969.[ 52] To
analyze its effects the Port Authority reviewed tower logs and compiled
average June-July and August-September data for 1968 and 1969. June-July 1968
corresponds to the period before the surcharge; August-September 1968 corresponds
to the period after the surcharge but before the quota system. Both surcharge
and quotas were in effect during 1969.[53] Although there were somedifferences
due to the 1968 controllers' slow down and the number of days when IFR
conditions prevailed, the results are still significant. GA activity dropped 43%
overall between June-July 1968 and 1969 and 49% during the 3 p.m. to 8 p.m.
peak period. Between August-September 1968 and 1969, GA dropped 31% both overall
and at the peak. Because the surcharge was already in effect during August-
September 1968, traffic during those months had already fallen 20-30% from June-
July, 1968. Therefore, the total traffic during August-September 1969 was
44 per cent less than in July, 1968. This information is summarized in Tables 12
and 13. [54]
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TABLE 12
AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT SUMMARY
JUNE-JULY
*
FAA ALLOCATIONS
Air Carrier
General Aviation
JFK La Guardia
48
1/
-- Air carrier allocation increases to 80 in the 5 PM-8 PM period
Note: The figures for 3 PM-8 PM and 5 PM-8 PM are average hourly movement
rates for those periods.
Percent
* . 1968 1969 Change
Avg. Day - Total 1,275 1,190 - 7
Air Carrier - Total 1,074 1,060 - 1
3-8 PM 66 65 -2
5-8 PM (Extra Alloc.) 69 67 - 3
General Aviation - Total 201 130 -35
3-8 PM 16 9 -44
5-8 PM 17 9 -47
*
La Guardia
Avg. Day - Total 963 878 -9
Air Carrier - Total 646 732 +13
3-8 PM 44 48 + 9
General Aviation - Total 317 146 -54
3-8 PM 21 9 -57
*
Newark
Avg. Day - Total 701 663 -5
Air Carrier - Total 497 531 + 7
3-B PM 32 34 + 6
General Aviation - Total 204 132 -35
3-8 PM 16 9 -44
Region
Avg. Day - Total 2,939 2,731 - 7
Air Carrier - Total 2,217 2,323 + 5
3-8 PM 142 147 + 4
General Aviation - Total 722 408 -43
3-8 PM 53 27 -49
Newark
40
TABLE 13
AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT SUMMARY
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER
JFK
Avg. Day - Total
Air Carrier - Total
3-8 PM
5-8 PM (Extra Alloc.)
General Aviation - Total
-3-8 PM
-5-8 PM
*
La Guardia
Avg. Day - Total
Air Carrier - Total
3-8 PM
General Aviation - Total
3-8 PM
*
Newark
Avg. Day - Total
Air Carrier - Total
3-8 PM
General Aviation - Total
3-8 PM
Region
Avg. Day - Total
Air Carrier - Total
3-8 PM
General Aviation - Total
3-8 PM
1968
Percent
Change1969
1,264 1,184 - 6
1,070 1,046 - 2
65 67 + 3
69 69 -
194 138 -29
14 . 9 -36
14 9 -36
865 843 - 3
641 701 + 9
46 48 . + 4
224 142 -36
14 9 -36
667 639 -4
495 514 + 4
.32 33 + 3
172 125 -27
11 9 -18
2,796
2,206
143
590
39
2,666
2,261
148
405
27
____________________________________ I I i
- 5
+ 2
+ 3
-31
-31
FAA ALLOCATIONS
Air Carrier
General Aviation
JFK
70
La Guardia.
48
12
Air carrier allocation increases to 80 in the 5 PM-8 PM period
Note: The figures for 3 PM-8 PM and 5 PM-8 PM are average hourly movement
rates for those periods.
Newark.
40
.66
Although air carrier traffic was up at each airport, overall operations
were down. In fact, both air carrier and GA were operating below their
allocation levels even at peak (except for peak air carrier traffic at
La Guardia).
Figures 8 and 9 show the GA movements at the three airports for an
average day in July and August, 1969, superimposed on the 1968 figures shown
earlier. 55 The combined effects of the surcharge and quota systems are
quite substantial at La Guardia where the peak level of GA movements was
reduced from 25 operations between 4 and 5 p.m. to 12 operations between 2
and 3 p.m. During the 3 p.m. to 8 p.m. period of peak congestion, the hourly
levels of GA operations were about 30% of the July, 1968 levels. While
somewhat less dramatic, peak operations at Kennedy and Newark also showed
substantial reductions and a general spreading of demand throughout the day.[56]
At Kennedy, GA operations exceeded the GA quota between 1 and 2 p.m. and
between 6 and 7 p.m. This was permitted because the air carriers were not
using all their allocations during those hours.
Because demand at Newark and Kennedy did not approach the allocations
available, the quota system was removed from Newark and restricted to the
3 to 8 p.m. peak at Kennedy in 1973.[
Figure 10 summarizes the overall trend in GA movements at the three
major New York airports from 1967 through 1970.[58] In 1967, there
were no controls. From August, 1968, to May, 1969, only the surcharge was
in effect. From June 1969 on, both the surcharge and quota system were
imposed. After each change the level of GA operations fell significantly.
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Delays continued to fall as operations decreased. Table 14 shows
the percentage of operations delayed by more than 30 minutes for July,
August and September, 1968 and 1969.[ 59] Although the numbers for July
and August 1968 may have been inflated by the controller's slow down, the
general reduction in delays continued into September when the ATC system
was almost back to normal.
Table 14
Percentage of Aircraft Delayed 30
or More - July, August, September
Table 15 shows the percentage change in overall
percentage change in the number of aircraft delayed
for the same time period.[60] While on the average
delays fell about 50%.
Minutes
- 1968,1969
operations and the
more than 30 minutes
traffic fell about 7%,
July August September
1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Region 17.0 11.8 14.1 4.9 7.6 4.8
Kennedy 29.4 17.1 27.1 7.7 12.2 6.4
La Guardia 12.0 8.5 5.2 3.3 4.6 4.8
Newark 2.8 6.5 2.8 1.8 3.4 2.3
Table 15
Percentage Change in Total Operations
and Number of Operations Delayed by
30 Minutes or More Between July, August,
and September 1968 and the Same Months
in 1969.
* 6.5% (1,433) of total flights delayed as compared
in 1968.
with 2.9% (708) flights
** 2.3% (523) of total flights delayed as compared with 3.4% (808) flights
in 1968.
Court Challenges
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), the primary national
organization representing general aviation interest, challenged both the
FAA's allocation system and the Port Authority's differential fee system
in the courts as being discriminatory and contrary to the public policy of
free access to the nation's airspace.
In formulating the quota system, the FAA conceded that
This rule grants a greater pribrity to certificated air carriers,
who provide common carrier service, in accordance with the policy
of recognizing a national interest in maintaining a public mass air
transportation system, offering service on equal terms to all who
would travel.. .The concept of 'first come-first served' remains
as the fundamental policy governing the use of air space so long
as capacity is adequate to meet the demands of all users without
immeasurable delay or inconvenience. When capacity limitations
compel a choice, however, the public service offered by the common
carrier must be preferred... .[61]
Ju y Aug st Septe ber
% Total % Delayed % Total % Delayed % Total % Delayed
Region -9.0 -67.0 -6.0 -67.0 -5.0 -39.0
Kennedy -5.0 -45.0 -4.0 -73.0 -5.0 -51.0
La Guardia -14.0 -38.0 -5.0 -39.0 -5.0 -2.0**
Newark -12.0 +102.0* -8.0 -41.0 -7.0 -35.0
This was challenged in Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association v. Volpe[62]
as being discriminatory and contrary to the basic policy of the Federal
Aviation Act that "There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of
any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit through
the navigable airspace of the United States."[63] Even though it agreed with
AOPA that air carriers were given an advantage under bad weather conditions
and that general aviation would experience considerable inconvenience and
perhaps considerable readjustment, nevertheless the Court found that the
regulation was proper after balancing the equities between general aviation
and carrier and public interests. The Court held that "there was a rational
basis for the rule adopted, that such a rule was within the regulatory author-
ity delegated to the Administrator and that the Administrator had adopted
the rule in a competent, deliberate and intelligent manner after having
properly pursued the rule making procedures provided by the Administrative
Procedures Act ,[64]
The Court was influenced by the facts that the allocation system only
applied during IFR conditions, or roughly 15% of the time, and that the original
regulation was temporary and due to expire on December 31, 1969. Thus, "the
relatively minor inconvenience., coupled with a critically serious congestion
problem...," [65] led the judge to uphold the regulation.
In Aircraft Owners and Pilots Assocation v. Port Authority of New York,[66]
AOPA challenged the surcharge on three grounds. First, the imposition of a
charge, with the specific intent of changing traffic patterns, was a direct
interference with traffic regulation which is solely entrusted to the FAA
by federal law and thus preempted from local control. Second, under its
enabling legislation and conditions imposed by the acceptance of federal
airport funds, the Port Authority was prohibited from discriminating between types
of traffic. Third, even if the Port Authority could make a distinction between
mass transportation by air carrier and private or general aviation, the dif-
ferent treatment given air taxis as compared to other forms of general
aviation was unjustly discriminatory.
The Preemption Issue
AOPA argued that the FAA's authority to regulate and control air traffic
was so pervasive that there was no room for the Port Authority's surcharge with
its clearly regulatory intent. Although there are several cases dealing with
aviation noise control that would seem to support AOPA's position, on closer
reading it is clear that the local noise control laws stricken down were in
direct conflict with federal regulation.[67] The Court found that the
fee schedule and its regulatory impact were not in conflict with the FAA's
regulations but that they worked in the same direction.
Nothing in the present fee schedule runs counter to the FAA
regulation in the sense that it seeks to authorize conduct
which the federal regulation prohibits or requires the ces-
sation of a practice required by federal regulation. United in
general purpose with the high density regulation, the revised fee
schedule, if viewed as a regulation of air traffic, simply has the
tendency further to restrict the traffic restricted by the federal
regulation, but to do so in a direction of restriction
and for an aim common to both sets of regulations. [68]
The Discrimination Issues
In addition to the freedom of airspace issue discussed in the Volpe case,
AOPA claimed that discrimination by the Port Authority is prohibited by its
acceptance of federal funds because "There shall be no exclusive right
for the use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon which
Federal funds have been expended."[69] Likewise, under the terms of the
Public Airport Development Act, before he can approve an airport project,
the Administrator of the FAA
"...shall receive assurances in writing satisfactory to him
that -
(1) the airport to which the project relates will be available for
public use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimi-
nation..."[70]
In receiving federal funds, the Port Authority had specifically agreed
that
"...it will keep the airport open to all types, kinds and classes
of aeronautical use without discrimination between such types,
kinds and classes; Provided... [it] may establish such fair, equal
and not unjustly discriminatory condition to be met by all users of
the Airport as may be necessary for the safe and efficient operation
of the Airport; and Provided Further, That...[it] may probibit or limit
any given type, kind or class of aeronautical use of the Airport if such
action is necessary for the safe operation of the airport or necessary to
serve the civil aviation needs of the public."[71]
The Court held that the fee structure was not unduly discriminatory because the
efficient utilization of airspace was a valid ground on which to establish preferen-
tial landing and take-off assignments. The Court went on to say
If it be true that all persons have equal rights of access to the
navigable air space, then it is not undifferentiated aircraft by count
that must be treated equally in landing approach and take-off. One air-
craft approach may represent the right of over 150 passengers to have
access to the navigable airways and landing areas. The next plane
may represent the right of one or two persons to have access to the air-
ways and landing areas. To treat them all alik' in allocating scarce
landing and take-off time and space is to ignore and not to recognize
the basic right of equal access to airways and landing areas. (Emphasis
added.) [72]
The Court then dismissed the third contention as well, holding
that air taxis are closer to mass transportation and covered by the over-
all public interest principle.
Given the unquestioned fact of airport congestion at the three
airports, the revised fee schedule draws a perfectly rational
line in separating mass transportation and its auxiliaries from
other aviation. The efficient utilization of air space in the
interest of the greatest number of users of the airspace plainly
justifies the first distinction between large and small aircraft....
The narrowly restricted exemption of air taxis that in effect operate
as connecting carriers and do not use interfering runways is justified
by the evident immediateness of connection with the dominant, mass
transportation concern of the air terminals.L73]
Summary
The use of a surcharge and quota system was a very effective way to
displace general aviation traffic from the major New York airports, making
more operations available for air carriers and reducing delay significantly.
It is estimated that the surcharge displaced an average of 4000GA flights per
month* and the quota system an additional 5,500 [74] (with reference to the
peak month of July, 1968, when there were 91,000 total operations at the three
airports: 67,000 airline and 24,000 general aviation[75]). The number of
aircaft delayed by 30 minutes or more during June through September, 1969, fell
to 8.3% (29,842) of total operations (359,192) as compared to 12.1% (41,760) of total
operations (385,066) for the same period in 1968.[76]
Although the legal issues as to whether the FAA can impose quotas and
airport operators can impose surcharges have not been settled by the Supreme
Court, the reasoning of the lower courts seems sound, which is probably why
they were not appealed. From that same reasoning, an airport operator could
not impose a quota system under its own authority, but must rely on the FAA.
Whether the FAA could legally charge a landing surcharge for its services
* Mr. Joseph Windisch of the Port Authority, informally estimates that the
fee would have to be $50.00 to be as effective today.
76
is beyond the scope of this study. However, judging from the reactions to the
1973 DOT Cost Allocation Study which advocated that FAA operations should be
funded by user fees, any attempt by the FAA to impose landing surcharges
would cause a great political controversy at this time.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main findings of this report can be summarized as follows:
First, the weight-based landing fees used by the overwhelming majority of
United States and world airports encourage additional users by discriminatory
charges based on willingness or ability to pay: lighter aircraft with fewer
passengers - flights which, on the average, contribute less "transportation
value" per operation - are charged lower prices than heavier, higher-capactiy
aircraft. This pricing policy is appropriate at underutilized, uncongested
facilities where the airport operator wants to attract as many users as possible
in order to maximize revenues and recover the highest possible proportion of the
initial and marginal facility costs. However, when an airport reaches full
capacity, this policy worsens the congestion because a prospective user need
only consider his own costs and delay which are but a small fraction of the
total marginal costs that his aircraft movement causes to all other users
especially if that user is a light aircraft operator.
Second, administrative measures, such as hourly quotas or total bans on
specific categories of aviation, can effectively deal with congestion problems
in the short run. If, however, these administrative policies are not coupled
with economic considerations, they may lead to poor results in the long run.
By indefinitely maintaining the status quo (in terms of the character and
identity of the airport users and of the capacity of the airport), the type and
quality of the transportation service may seriously deviate from what would
maximize social benefits. The economic signals for growth and/or change are
suppressed.
Third, the "value of transportation" at a congested airport is maximized
if and only if each airport user is charged full marginal delay costs. Each
additional flight must pay for all the additional costs it imposes on other
passengers and aircraft operators. If ticket prices are flexible, it is
inmaterial whether these marginal delay costs are charged to the airline for
each flight or whether they are directly charged to the passengers on the
flights because the airline will ultimately pass the charge on to the passen-
gers. However, where ticket prices are fixed by regulation, the congestion
tolls (equal to marginal delay costs) should be charged to the airlines for
each flight rather than be assessed to the passengers directly. Otherwise, the
carriers will continue to compete through service by offering excessive frequency
and will change the size of the aircraft used rather than eliminate flights.
Fourth, a time-varying structure of airport usage fees based on the
principle of marginal cost pricing is theoretically both necessary and
sufficient to guarantee the socially optimal utilization of airport capacity.
Unfortunately, serious problems arise in practice both in the numerical deter-
mination of what these pricing schedules should be and in the implementation of
a pricing policy based solely on optimizing total social value without regard
for revenue requirements.
The primary difficulties in determining price structures are the near
impossibility of estimating the elasticities and cross-elasticities of airport
(demand with respect to airport usage charges (especially for airlines with a
tightly interdependent flight schedule) and the lack of sufficiently powerful
(mathematical techniques for dealing with the "dynamics" of shifting demand as
runway prices change.
At the implementation level, an airport's financial objectives (such as
recovering investments or meeting a specified return on investment) are unrelated
to the objective of maximizing the value of the transportation provided to society.
If these objectives are incompatible, the implementation of a pure, marginal-cost-
based pricing structure may be blocked.
Fifth, perhaps the most important obstacle to implementation of marginal
cost pricing at major airports is the fact that, in its pure form, such a pricing
system does not consider a user's willingness or ability to pay: each user is
simply charged for all the delay costs that he imposes on others. During peak-
traffic periods, the resulting charges may be hard or impossible to bear for
certain kinds of aviation. Specifically, high landing charges, when considered
as a percentage of a flight's value to the aircraft operator, will have the
greatest impact on general aviation, then "third-level" commuter flights, then
short-haul regional carrier flights and finally short-haul trunk earrier flights.
Most of the reduction in peak-hour operations as a result of marginal cost
pricing is likely to come from these categories.
Although this is entirely consistent with the desired effects of the pricing
policy - those who use the airport will be the ones who derive the highest
value from such use - airport and civil aviation authorities everywhere will
probably be reluctant to adopt in one sudden step a practice which is so dras-
tically different from the current system. The reasons for this reluctance may
be, on the one hand, "political" (i.e. apprehension about the various forms of
opposition that a policy change of this type will probably generate) and, on the
other hand, uncertainty regarding the immediate and long-term effects that a
completely new pricing policy will have on airport use.
Based on these findings, the following overall conclusions regarding the
potential role of alternatives to capital investment in more efficiently
allocating and utilizing existing airport capacity can be drawn:
First, the present weight-based methods for computing runway fees are as
*
good as any for recovering costs at uncongested airports seeking "self-support".
* "Self-support" is used here in a qualified manner to indicate recovery of
direct construction, maintenance and operation costs for airport facili-
ties and ignores the large, indirect subsidies that airports receive from
taxpayers at large.
Aircraft weight is an adequate proxy for an operator's willingness and
ability to pay and approximates the marginal facility costs imposed by differ-
ent types of aircraft use. As soon as significant congestion problems begin
appearing at an airport, however, the weight-based runway fees become counter-
productive.
In this case administrative measures (probably in the form of hourly
quotas) for limiting airport demand during periods of congestion can be applied.
These measures, however, should be viewed only as effective "stop-gap" solutions
unless they are coupled with some type of pricing mechanism for determining the
value of the time-slots to potential users. Reliance on purely administrative
measures for a long time leads to distortions both in the quality and type of
the transportation provided and in the perceptions of transportation planners
regarding the urgency and need for airport capacity expansion.
Peak-hour surcharges based on the increased marginal delay costs during
peak traffic hours are a better method for limiting use than a quota system,
but the problems of determining what the peak-hour surcharges should be and
what the impact of a peak-hour surcharge (in its pure form which does not
consider the user's ability to pay) may be on the air transportation system
must be solved. The question is not whether they should be adopted but how.
The best solution for congested airports may be a hybrid system that
combines a quota to meet immediate needs with the gradual introduction of
time-dependent pricing as the quota is phased out. Specifically, a congested
airport would impose a quota limiting the operations permitted to a number
that could be handled without significant congestion or delay. At the same
time, a small peak-hour surcharge would be imposed during peak periods. A
few users might decide they no longer want to operate during the peak because
of the surcharge, but most would be unaffected. The available time-slots would
be.allocated among these remaining candidates. In this first stage, the
airport uses the surcharge to discourage some users and-administrative fiat
to select the number of peak-hour operations compatible with reasonably smooth
operation of the facility. If the number of candidates willing to pay the
initial small surcharge exceeds the quota for smooth operations, it is a
signal to the airport that the surcharge is too low.
In the second stage (perhaps after a year or more has elapsed) the peak-
hour surcharge would be increased. Fewer candidates will bid for the available
slots and the quota system will thus play a less vital role in determining
who will use the airport. After a few upward adjustments, the amount of the
surcharge should equal the marginal delay costs imposed on other users by an
additional user during the peak traffic periods. At that point, a pricing
mechanism is fully effective and administrative measures can be fully phased
out. Any user, irrespective of identity, who is willing to pay the runway fees
at this point should be given access to the airport because the value of access
to that user is at least as high as the delay costs he imposes on other users.
If, after marginal cost pricing is fully in effect, the total amount of
money collected from peak-hour surcharges is large as compared to the cost of
expansion, the value of airport expansion is high and capital investment should
be considered.
The main advantages of the scheme just outlined are that it allows for a
trial-and-error, yet orderly, determination of an appropriate price structure
for use of the airport; that it provides for a long transition period during
which both the airport administrators and the airport users have an oppportunity
*
to fully understand the new system and to weigh its consequences for themselves;
and that it permits the users to consider carefully the use of alternative air-
*It is even possible, in order to smooth the transition, to initially vary the
peak-hour surcharges by type of user. In the first stage, for example, a
smaller peak-hour surcharge could apply, say, to short-haul than to long-haul
f1lights (to take into account ability-to-pay).
ports and the impact of changes in the timing of flights and the type of
aircraft used. Thus, the scheme confronts in a practical way the two main
difficulties of implementing pricing mechanisms.
This approach is very close to that actually used by the British Airports
Authority. A small peak hour charge was introduced in addition to the existing
quota system. It has been slowly increased and made more elaborate as
experience has been gained.
In New York the experience was similar except the surcharge was imposed
before the quota. Once both were in effect, the desired goal of limiting
general aviation at the three major airports was achieved and no further
changes in the fee system were needed. In fact, the quotas were removed when
experience indicated they were no longer needed.
However, there are still unanswered questions. Will the BAA system
have substantial impact on demand as the fee levels become significant over
the next few years? Could the New York experience be extended to other classes
of traffic? Also, the phase-in approach does not address the problem of how
to cover revenue requirements if the peak pricing policy does not generate
sufficient funds (which indicates that the facilities are overdeveloped).
With these limitations in mind, the following recommendations can be made:
First, because time-varying runway fees based on delay costs are theoreti-
cally the most economically efficient way to allocate existing capacity at
congested airports, they should be given the full attention of the Federal
Aviation Administration and the airport operators of the United States. The
potential savings from postponing or eliminating capital investment and from
increasing the efficiency of the air transportation system are enormous.
Second, the FAA and airport operators should closely monitor the BAA
experience at Heathrow Airport and consider a similar experiment at a major
airport in the United States. The rationale of the BAA's policy and its
intended goals should be fully understood and explored.
Third, further study of approaches that contribute to efficient utilization
of existing airport capacity should be encouraged and supported. In particular,
the analysis of the problem through the use of recently developed quantitative
techniques appears to be a promising area for work with potentially large pay-
offs.
Fourth, the institutional issues facing the United States before a peak-
hour surcharge system could be widely adopted must be explored. These center
around whether the charges should be imposed and controlled by the FAA or the
local operator and whether the large charges that will be needed to shift demand
are politically acceptable. This policy would represent a radical departure
from our traditional concepts of free airspace and generally free access to
aviation facilities and services. In the long run, these institutional
issues may be more important than the economic ones.
